Week 13: Lecture B Hardware Testing

Wednesday, April 10, 2024



How are semester projects going?

Making progress?





Stuck?





The Next Few Weeks

Part 4: New Frontiers in Fuzzing	
Monday Meeting	Wednesday Meeting
Apr. 01	Apr. 03
Fuzzing OS Kernels	LLM-guided Fuzzing
▶ Readings:	▶ Readings:
Apr. 08	Apr. 10
Fuzzing Compilers (guest lecture by John Regehr)	Fuzzing Hardware
▶ Readings:	▶ Readings:
Apr. 15 Fuzzing Multi-language Software ▶ Readings:	Apr. 17 Final Presentations I
Apr. 22	Apr. 24
Final Presentations II	No Class (Reading Day)



Recap: Project Schedule

Apr. 17th & 22nd: final presentations

- 15-20 5-minute slide deck and discussion
- What you did, and why, and what results
- We have 26 teams...
 - So, 13 teams per two days
 - 5 minute presentation each
 - One-minute audience Q&A
 - Keep the details tight!
- What's most important:
 - High-level technique
 - Challenges and workarounds
 - Key results (bugs found, other successes, etc.)



Questions?






Hardware Security and Testing




Hardware







Hardware






Hardware



























Stefan Nagy


Hardware Bugs





Stefan Nagy

Hardware Bugs





Hardware Bugs






Stefan Nagy

- Trojan Horse:
 - **•** ???



Trojan Horse:

- Attack pre-inserted into chip
- Will be exploited at run time
- **Remotely triggered** by attacker






Trojan Horse:

- Attack pre-inserted into chip
- Will be exploited at run time
- Remotely triggered by attacker



- Small
- Stealthy
- Controllable




Trojan Horse:

- Attack pre-inserted into chip
- Will be exploited at run time
- Remotely triggered by attacker

Ideal characteristics:

- Small
- Stealthy
- Controllable

Engineering a trigger



Israeli sky-hack switched off Syrian radars countrywide

Backdoors penetrated without violence

A Lewis Page


Thu 22 Nov 2007 // 13:57 UTC

More rumours are starting to leak out regarding the mysterious Israeli air raid against Syria in September. It is now suggested that "computer to computer" techniques and "air-to-ground network penetration" took place.


The latest revelations are made by well-connected *Aviation Week* journalists. Electronic-warfare correspondent David Fulghum says that US intelligence and military personnel "provided advice" to the Israelis regarding methods of breaking into the Syrian air-defence network.

Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

Guin et al.: Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain




Russia is resorting to putting computer chips from dishwashers and refrigerators in tanks due to US sanctions, official says



Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

Counterfeit and recycled chips have a shorter lifespan

Absolutely dangerous for security-critical use cases






Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

Counterfeit and recycled chips have a shorter lifespan

Absolutely dangerous for security-critical use cases





Secure Hardware

Can we ever know for sure that a chip is secure?





Hardware Testing


- One of the highest-paid (and steep-learning-curve) careers in testing
 - **Spoiler:** it's even harder than testing software

¢	Electrical Hardware Test		
R	Hardware Test Engineer	HNN	Hardware Test Engineer




Testing Hardware Physically








Testing Hardware Physically





Testing Hardware Pre-Silicon

- Idea: apply testing to the HDL (Hardware Description Lang.)
 - E.g., Verilog
- Benefits over physical testing?




0

HOLD

Testing Hardware Pre-Silicon

- Idea: apply testing to the HDL (Hardware Description Lang.)
 - E.g., Verilog
- Benefits over physical testing?
 - Downsides?



Enter the Simulation

Idea: "translate" HDL to a more workable representation (e.g., C++)



Questions?



