

Week 13: Lecture B

Hardware Testing

Wednesday, April 10, 2024

How are semester projects going?

Making progress?



Stuck?



The Next Few Weeks

Part 4: New Frontiers in Fuzzing

Monday Meeting

Apr. 01

Fuzzing OS Kernels

► Readings:

Apr. 08

Fuzzing Compilers (guest lecture by [John Regehr](#))

► Readings:

Apr. 15

Fuzzing Multi-language Software

► Readings:

Apr. 22

Final Presentations II

Wednesday Meeting

Apr. 03

LLM-guided Fuzzing

► Readings:

Apr. 10

Fuzzing Hardware

► Readings:

Apr. 17

Final Presentations I

Apr. 24

No Class (Reading Day)

Recap: Project Schedule

- **Apr. 17th & 22nd:** final presentations
 - ~~45-20~~ **5-minute** slide deck and discussion
 - What you did, and why, and what results
- We have 26 teams...
 - So, 13 teams per two days
 - **5 minute presentation each**
 - One-minute audience Q&A
 - Keep the details tight!
- What's most important:
 - High-level technique
 - Challenges and workarounds
 - Key results (bugs found, other successes, etc.)




Questions?




Hardware Security and Testing

Hardware



Hardware



Hardware




FORESHADOW




The foundation
of our computers



MELTDOWN




Weaknesses weaken
the entire system




SPECTRE


Creating Hardware




Creating Hardware




Creating Hardware




Creating Hardware




Creating Hardware




Hardware Bugs



Hardware Bugs



Hardware Bugs




Hardware Trojans

- **Trojan Horse:**
 - ???

Hardware Trojans

■ Trojan Horse:

- Attack pre-inserted into chip
- Will be **exploited** at **run time**
- **Remotely triggered** by attacker




Hardware Trojans

■ Trojan Horse:

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■ Ideal characteristics:

- Small
- Stealthy
- Controllable



Hardware Trojans

- **Trojan Horse:**
 - Attack pre-inserted into chip
 - Will be **exploited** at **run time**
 - **Remotely triggered** by attacker
- **Ideal characteristics:**
 - Small
 - Stealthy
 - Controllable
- **Engineering a trigger**

```
1 void attack_signed_c() {  
2     volatile int a, b, c = 0;  
3  
4     while(1) {  
5         int c1 = c;  
6         int b1 = b;  
7  
8         int i1 = ((b1 / c1) + 1);  
9         int i2 = ((i1 / c1) + 1);  
10        int i3 = ((i2 / c1) + 1);  
11        int i4 = ((i3 / c1) + 1);  
12        int i5 = ((i4 / c1) + 1);  
13        int i6 = ((i5 / c1) + 1);  
14        int i7 = ((i6 / c1) + 1);  
15        int i8 = ((i7 / c1) + 1);  
16        int i9 = ((i8 / c1) + 1);  
17  
18        a = ((i9 / c1) + 1);  
19    }  
20 }
```

Division sets
div-by-zero flag

Addition resets
div-by-zero flag

Software state will
affect **analog state!**

Hardware Trojans

Israeli sky-hack switched off Syrian radars countrywide

Backdoors penetrated without violence

 [Lewis Page](#)


Thu 22 Nov 2007 // 13:57 UTC

More rumours are starting to leak out regarding the mysterious Israeli air raid against Syria in September. It is now suggested that "computer to computer" techniques and "air-to-ground network penetration" took place.


The latest revelations are made by well-connected *Aviation Week* journalists. Electronic-warfare correspondent David Fulghum says that US intelligence and military personnel "provided advice" to the Israelis regarding methods of breaking into the Syrian air-defence network.

Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

Guin *et al.*: Counterfeit Integrated Circuits: A Rising Threat in the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain




Russia is resorting to putting computer chips from dishwashers and refrigerators in tanks due to US sanctions, official says




Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

- **Counterfeit** and **recycled chips** have a **shorter lifespan**
 - Absolutely dangerous for security-critical use cases



Recycled and Counterfeit Hardware

- **Counterfeit** and **recycled chips** have a **shorter lifespan**
 - Absolutely dangerous for security-critical use cases




Secure Hardware

- Can we ever know for sure that a chip is **secure**?




Hardware Testing

- One of the highest-paid (and steep-learning-curve) careers in testing
 - **Spoiler:** it's even harder than testing software




Electrical Hardware Test Engineer
Apple
Santa Clara, CA
via Careers At Apple

Full-time Health insurance Dental insurance




Hardware Test Engineer
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
Culver City, CA
via ZipRecruiter

Full-time Health insurance Dental insurance
Paid time off



Hardware Test Engineer
Red Six Aerospace
United States
via ZipRecruiter

Full-time Health insurance Dental insurance




Hardware Test Engineer
Hanna Instruments
Woonsocket, RI
via LinkedIn


5 days ago Full-time Health insurance

Testing Hardware **Physically**


- How could we even do this?




Signal Generator



Hardware Chip




Success




Failure

Testing Hardware **Physically**


- **How could we even do this?**
 - **Downsides?**



Signal Generator



Hardware Chip



Success




Failure

Testing Hardware **Pre-Silicon**


- **Idea:** apply testing to the HDL (Hardware Description Lang.)

- E.g., Verilog

- Benefits over physical testing?



1. Q is undefined until R is asserted
2. Q → '1' when S is asserted
3. Q → '0' when R is asserted
4. Q → '1' when S is asserted
5. Q stays at '1' when S & R asserted
6. Q → '0' when R asserted, S de-asserted




S	R	Q	QN
0	0	1	1
0	1	1	0
1	0	0	1
1	1	HOLD	

Asserted low inputs
Set Dominant

NAND Basic Cell

Testing Hardware **Pre-Silicon**

- **Idea:** apply testing to the HDL (Hardware Description Lang.)
 - E.g., Verilog
- Benefits over physical testing?
 - **Downsides?**



Enter the **Simulation**

- **Idea:** “translate” HDL to a more workable representation (e.g., C++)



- Benefits?
 - **Downsides?**

Questions?

