


L21

L20: Privacy

Jeff M. Phillips



X is a data set


↳ clusters

↳ regressor

↳ classify (ML)

$x \in X$

↳ this is good!



Example: Heath Records

STORY TIME:

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- ▶ Dr. Sweeney now teaches at Harvard.

Define Anonymity

full data set D

map $\rightarrow D'$

detailed as possible
+ not identify
any one
 $x \in D$

- k -anonymity: categorical data

no group $S \subset D'$ will be only with specific traits and $|S| < k$.

- l -diversity: " l -well separated" hidden traits, each group S , has at least l traits

- t -closeness: if hidden traits, must be t -close to distribution of full population

• Figure out the Sylvester Stallone
has average height of men in NJ.

• Survey in NJ average height 5'8"

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And another set $D_2 = \{\langle \text{user-id}, \text{movie}, \text{date of grade} \rangle\}$.
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- ▶ Netflix Prize had proposed sequel, dropped in 2010 for more privacy concerns.

Differential Privacy

$D_1 \leftarrow$ true data

$D_2 \leftarrow$ released (given access)

and somehow D_1, D_2 are close.

also protect individual data points.

queries $g \in \mathcal{Q}$ ask of D_1 or D_2 ,

property \mathcal{R}


example $g(D_1) \rightarrow$ ages of class
 $\mathcal{R} \rightarrow$ # older 30.

D_1, D_2
 ϵ -differentially
private.

$$\frac{\Pr[g(D_1) \in \mathcal{R}]}{\Pr[g(D_2) \in \mathcal{R}]} \leq \exp(\epsilon) \approx 1 + \epsilon$$

Interactive Approaches

Trusted Entity with D .




Non-Interactive

Store $D_2 = D_1 + \text{Noise}$

Leptacian Noise

$$\text{Lep}(\epsilon) = c \exp(-\epsilon)$$



D ← true data set

S_0 Stallone's height
in inches

+ Lap(ϵ)

ϵ

D_1

68

+ Lap(ϵ)

ϵ

D_2

67

$$\frac{P_r[D \geq 70 | D_1]}{P_r[D \geq 70 | D_2]} \approx \frac{e^{-2\epsilon}}{e^{-3\epsilon}} e^{\epsilon} \approx 1 + \epsilon$$