

SafetyNet: Improving the Availability of Shared Memory Multiprocessors with Global Checkpoint/Recovery

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Abstract

We develop an availability solution, called SafetyNet, that uses a unified, lightweight checkpoint/recovery mechanism to support multiple long-latency fault detection schemes. At an abstract level, SafetyNet logically maintains multiple, globally consistent checkpoints of the state of a shared memory multiprocessor (i.e., processors, memory, and coherence permissions), and it recovers to a pre-fault checkpoint of the system and re-executes if a fault is detected. SafetyNet efficiently coordinates checkpoints across the system in logical time and uses “logically atomic” coherence transactions to free checkpoints of transient coherence state. SafetyNet minimizes performance overhead by pipelining checkpoint validation with subsequent parallel execution.

We illustrate SafetyNet avoiding system crashes due to either dropped coherence messages or the loss of an interconnection network switch (and its buffered messages). Using full-system simulation of a 16-way multiprocessor running commercial workloads, we find that SafetyNet (a) adds statistically insignificant runtime overhead in the common-case of fault-free execution, and (b) avoids a crash when tolerated faults occur.

1 Introduction

Availability has become increasingly important as internet services are integrated more tightly into society’s infrastructure. Availability is particularly crucial for the shared-memory multiprocessor servers that run the application services and database management systems that must robustly manage business data. However, unless architectural steps are taken, availability will decrease over time as implementations use larger numbers of increasingly unreliable components in search of higher performance [21, 43]. The high clock frequencies and small circuit dimensions of future systems will increase their susceptibility to

both transient and permanent faults. For example, higher frequencies exacerbate crosstalk [3, 8] and supply voltage noise [39], and smaller devices and wires suffer more from electromigration and alpha particle disruptions [36, 49].

Decades of research in fault-tolerant systems suggest a path toward addressing this problem. Mission-critical systems routinely employ redundant processors, memories, and interconnects (e.g., triple-modular redundancy [26] or pair-and-spare [45]) to tolerate a broad class of faults. However, for many applications, the highly competitive commercial market will seek lower overhead solutions. For example, RAID level 5 [31] has been deployed widely because its overhead is 1/Nth (for N data disks) rather than the 100% overhead for mirroring. In contrast to mission-critical systems, commercial servers aim for high availability but will accept occasional crashes to improve cost/performance. Software-visible techniques—including database logging and clustering—help preserve data integrity and service availability in these cases.

Current servers employ a range of hardware mechanisms to improve availability. RAID, error correcting codes (ECC), interconnection network link-level retry [18], and duplicate ALUs with processor retry [40] target specific, localized faults such as transient bit flips at memory, links, or ALUs. Computer architects seeking system-wide coverage currently must integrate a patchwork of localized detection and recovery schemes.

In this paper, we seek a unified, lightweight mechanism that provides end-to-end recovery from a broad class of transient and permanent faults. This recovery mechanism can be combined with a wide range of fault detection mechanisms, including strong error detection codes (e.g., CRCs), redundant processors and ALUs [18, 40], redundant threads [37], and system-level state checkers [9]. By decoupling recovery from detection, our approach allows a range of implementations with varying cost-performance.

We develop a lightweight global checkpoint/recovery scheme called *SafetyNet*, and we illustrate its abstraction in Figure 1. *SafetyNet* periodically creates a system-wide (logical) checkpoint. *SafetyNet* checkpoints can span thousands or even millions of execution cycles, permitting

This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation, with grants EIA-9971256, CDA-9623632, and CCR-0105721, Intel Graduate Fellowship (Sorin), IBM Graduate Fellowship (Martin), two Wisconsin Romnes Fellowships (Hill and Wood), and donations from Compaq Computer Corporation, Intel Corporation, IBM, and Sun Microsystems.




Figure 1. SafetyNet Abstraction. In SafetyNet, ❶ processors operate on the current state of the system, ❷ the system recovers to the recovery point if a fault is detected, and ❸ some number of non-current checkpoints can be pending validation.

powerful detection mechanisms with long latencies. After detecting a fault, all processors, caches, and memories revert to and resume execution from a consistent system-wide state, the *recovery point*. *SafetyNet* is a hardware scheme that requires no changes to any software or the instruction set. Moreover, *SafetyNet* has limited impact on the processor, coherence protocol, and I/O subsystem.

SafetyNet's basic approach is to log all changes to the architected state. This presents three main challenges for a lightweight recovery scheme. First, naively saving previous values before every register update, cache write, and coherence response would require a prohibitive amount of storage. Second, all processors, caches, and memories in a shared-memory multiprocessor must recover to a consistent point. For example, recovery must ensure that all nodes agree on the coherence ownership and data values of each memory block. Third, *SafetyNet* must determine when it is safe to advance the recovery point (i.e., validate a new checkpoint), without degrading performance to wait for slow fault detection mechanisms.

SafetyNet efficiently meets these three challenges, as described in Section 2. First, logging is reduced by checkpointing at a coarse granularity (e.g., 100,000 cycles). Only the first change to a piece of architectural state—register, memory block, or coherence permission—within a checkpoint interval requires a log entry, reducing the log overhead by one or two orders of magnitude. Second, *SafetyNet* efficiently coordinates checkpoint creation using *global logical time* and *logically atomic coherence transactions*, ensuring a consistent recovery point. Third, checkpoint validation is pipelined and overlapped with normal execution. Pipelining validation allows *SafetyNet* to tolerate long latency detection mechanisms while continuing execution.

In Section 3, we develop a *SafetyNet* implementation that minimizes runtime overheads for actions in the common case of fault-free execution, including memory operations and coherence transactions. Figure 2 depicts the structures




Figure 2. Example SafetyNet System

necessary to maintain checkpoint state—register checkpoints and Checkpoint Log Buffers (CLBs)—added to processor-memory nodes of an example system implementation. Register checkpoints, CLBs, caches, and memories are deemed “stable storage” and must be protected by ECC, because *SafetyNet* cannot recover from uncorrectable errors to these structures. Addressing this class of faults, including processor-cache chip kills, is future work.

SafetyNet is a recovery mechanism that is largely decoupled from any specific fault detection mechanisms. However, to make the exposition more concrete, we use two system-level faults as running examples. We focus on the two faults presented below, and we describe their causes and detection mechanisms in more detail in Table 1.

- (1) **Dropped Message:** A transient fault causes the loss of a coherence message in the interconnect.
- (2) **Failed Switch:** A hard fault kills a switch element, irretrievably losing all buffered messages.

In Section 4, full system simulations with commercial workloads show that, in the common case of fault-free execution, *SafetyNet* does not increase execution time (relative to an unprotected system) by a statistically significant amount. Moreover, *SafetyNet* continues to run after the injection of the two example faults. Recovery time is reduced from a system crash/reboot to a performance “speed bump” of less than one millisecond. We also show that 512 kbyte CLBs are large enough, for our commercial

Table 1. Two Example Faults

<p>Dropped Message: This example fault assumes a lost or misrouted coherence message due to a transient environmental condition (e.g., alpha particle [28, 36, 49]). The fault may corrupt the message while it is stored in a switch buffer or by disrupting a switch’s internal logic. The fault might be detected using an error detection code (e.g., CRC), by an endpoint receiving an illegal message, or by a request timing out. The detection latency may be large in the case of request timeout or if longer error detection codes are used (longer codes are inherently stronger).</p> <p>Failed Switch: This example fault assumes the permanent loss of an interconnect switch element (e.g., due to electromigration), causing the loss of all buffered messages. We consider a 2D torus topology that prevents a single point-of-failure by splitting each switch into two half-switches. As illustrated in Figure 2, nodes have separate paths to the north-south and east-west half-switches, providing redundancy in case one half-switch fails. We use the same mechanisms discussed above to detect the fault. Execution may resume after reconfiguring the interconnect to route around the lost switch [14], but with some loss of bandwidth.</p>
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workloads, to tolerate fault detection mechanisms with over 100,000 cycles of latency.

Section 5 expands upon the wide variety of faults and detection mechanisms compatible with *SafetyNet*. Like most prior work, we focus on tolerating all single faults, plus coverage for many double faults.

2 SafetyNet Overview

This section presents a high-level overview of *SafetyNet*, while Section 3 describes one specific implementation.

2.1 High-Level View

SafetyNet periodically checkpoints the system state, to allow the system to recover its state to a consistent previous checkpoint. If a fault is detected, *SafetyNet* recovers the state to the *recovery point*, the old checkpoint most recently validated fault-free. Checkpoints between the recovery point and the active system state are pending validation. A system-wide checkpoint includes the state of the processor registers, memory values, and coherence permissions. *SafetyNet* has a small impact on the underlying cache coherence protocol. We assume a sequentially consistent memory model, and *SafetyNet* does not affect its implementation.

SafetyNet addresses the three challenges for logging schemes described in Section 1. First, *SafetyNet* exploits a coarse checkpoint granularity to reduce the amount of logging (Section 2.2). Second, *SafetyNet* creates consistent global checkpoints (Section 2.3) such that all processors and memories recover to a consistent recovery point upon fault detection. Third, *SafetyNet* pipelines checkpoint validation off the critical path and hides the latencies of fault detection mechanisms (Section 2.4).

2.2 Checkpointing Via Logging

Logically, *SafetyNet* checkpoints contain a complete copy of the system’s architectural state. For efficiency, *SafetyNet* explicitly checkpoints registers and incrementally checkpoints memory state by logging previous values and coherence permissions. Conceptually, processors and memory

controllers log every change to the memory/coherence state (i.e., save the *old* copy of the block) whenever an action (i.e., a store or a transfer of ownership) might have to be undone. To reduce storage and bandwidth requirements, *SafetyNet* only logs the block on the first such action per checkpoint interval. By using coarse checkpoint intervals (e.g., 100,000 cycles), *SafetyNet* significantly reduces logging overhead (evaluated in Section 4.3). Checkpointing of processor register state can be done in many ways, including shadow copies or writing the registers into the cache.

2.3 Creating Consistent Checkpoints

All of the components (caches and memory controllers) coordinate their local checkpoints, so that the collection of local checkpoints represents a consistent global recovery point. Coordinated system-wide checkpointing avoids both cascading rollbacks [15] and an output commit problem [16] for inter-node communication. Checkpoints are coordinated across the system in *logical time* to avoid a potentially costly exchange of synchronization messages.

To ensure that checkpoints reflect consistent system states, the logical time base must ensure that all components can independently determine the checkpoint interval in which any coherence transaction occurs (not just its request). We exploit the key insight that, in retrospect, a coherence transaction appears logically atomic once it completes. A transaction’s *point of atomicity* occurs when the previous owner of the requested block processes the request. To inform the requestor, the response includes the checkpoint number of the point of atomicity. Figure 3 illustrates how *SafetyNet* determines this point. Note that the requestor does not learn the location of the atomicity point until it receives the response that completes the transaction. To ensure that the system never recovers to the “middle” of a transaction, the requestor does not agree to advance the recovery point until all of its outstanding transactions complete successfully. After completion, the transaction appears atomic, so there is no “middle.” Furthermore, by waiting for outstanding transactions to complete, *SafetyNet* avoids checkpointing transient coherence states and in-flight messages.




Figure 3. Example of Checkpoint Coordination

In this example, physical time flows downwards, and checkpoint lines in logical time are not necessarily horizontal, since logical time is not equal to physical time. Logical time respects causality, so a message cannot be sent in one checkpoint interval and arrive in an earlier interval. At ①, the processor requests ownership of block B from the memory, which is currently the owner of the block. The memory processes the request at ② and defines the transaction's point of atomicity, sending checkpoint number (CN) 3 along with the data. In retrospect, the transaction appears to have occurred atomically at this point. A recovery to CN 2 or before would restore ownership to the memory. A recovery to CN 3 or later would maintain ownership at the processor. A recovery to CN 2-5 (the duration of the transaction) is not possible until after the transaction, since the processor would not validate any of these checkpoints until the transaction completed successfully at ③.

Many bases of logical time exist. A simple example in a broadcast snooping system is for each component to count the number of coherence requests it has processed and use that as its logical time. If components create checkpoints every K logical cycles, it is trivial for all components to agree on the interval in which a transaction's request occurred. In this paper, we focus on systems with directory protocols, and thus we need a different logical time base. If we could distribute a perfectly synchronous physical clock, we would have a viable logical time base in which logical and physical time are the same. In Section 3, we relax this requirement by deriving a logical time base from a loosely synchronized *checkpoint clock*.

2.4 Validating Checkpoints

Checkpoint validation is the process of determining which checkpoint is the recovery point. Processors and memories coordinate checkpoint validation so that all components recover to the same checkpoint number on a recovery.

Coordination can be pipelined and performed in the background. For example, checkpoint number k can be validated only if every component agrees that it could be the recovery point, i.e., all execution prior to checkpoint number k was fault-free. For a checkpoint interval to be fault-free, every transfer of ownership in that interval must complete successfully, by which we mean that the data was transferred fault-free to the requestor. Once every component has independently declared that it has received fault-free data in response to all of its requests in the interval before the checkpoint, the recovery point can be advanced. At this point, all transactions prior to this checkpoint have had their points of atomicity determined. After validation, state for the prior recovery point can be deallocated lazily.

Validation latency depends on fault detection latency, since a checkpoint cannot be validated until it has been verified fault free. For our fault examples, the detection latency is as long as the requestor's timeout latency. Timeout latency can be many traversals of the interconnect, plus some slack built in for contention delays. Adding to validation latency, validation cannot occur until all nodes have coordinated their validations, and this involves an exchange of messages. Since validation latency is long, *SafetyNet* performs validation in the background and off the critical path.

Checkpoint validation also determines when the system can interact with the outside world of I/O devices. The *output commit problem* [16] requires that only validated, fault-free data can be communicated outside of the sphere of recovery. For example, the system cannot communicate unvalidated data with the disks if the effects of this communication cannot be undone through recovery. A standard solution is to delay all output events generated within a checkpoint until that checkpoint is validated. A standard solution for the *input commit problem* [16] is to log incoming messages so that they can be replayed after recovery.

2.5 Recovering to a Consistent Global State

If a fault is detected, *SafetyNet* restores the globally consistent recovery point. The recovery point represents the consistent state of the system at the *logical time* that this checkpoint was taken. Recovery itself requires that the processors restore their register checkpoints and that the caches and memories unroll their local logs to recover the system to the consistent global state at the pre-fault recovery point. All state associated with transactions in progress at the time of recovery is discarded, since this state is (by definition) unvalidated state that occurs logically after the recovery point. After recovery, the system reconfigures, if necessary, and resumes execution from the recovery point. For the lost switch example, reconfiguration involves routing around the faulty switch.

3 A *SafetyNet* Implementation

In this section, we discuss one implementation of the *SafetyNet* abstraction. Our goal is to incur low overhead in the common case of fault-free execution, while not allocating resources towards optimizing the rare case of recovery.

3.1 System Model

Figure 2 illustrates a single node, containing a processor, a cache, and a portion of the system’s shared memory. A *Checkpoint Log Buffer* (*CLB*), associated with each cache hierarchy and each memory controller, stores logged state. Processor register checkpoints are maintained in shadow registers. Nodes communicate through a 2D torus interconnection network. The cache coherence protocol is based on a typical MOSI directory protocol¹, and *SafetyNet* has only a slight impact on it. The system also includes redundant system service controllers (which exist in many servers, such as the UltraEnterprise E10000’s service processors [10]), that help coordinate advancement of the recovery point as well as system restart after recovery.

3.2 Logical Time Base

As discussed in Section 2, checkpoints are coordinated across the system in logical time. For our system with directory-based coherence, we use a loosely synchronous (in physical time) *checkpoint clock* that is distributed redundantly to ensure no single point of failure. On each edge of this clock, each component creates a checkpoint and increments its *current checkpoint number* (*CCN*). While it might be difficult to distribute a synchronous clock across a system with near-zero skew, it is not nearly so difficult to distribute one with the same frequency and some amount of skew between nodes. As long as the skew between any two nodes is less than the minimum communication time between these nodes, the checkpoint clock is a valid base of logical time, since no message can travel backwards in logical time.²

We use logical time to address the primary challenge in coordinating checkpoints across a system, which is keeping checkpoints consistent with respect to memory and coherence state. All components must agree, for every coherence transaction, on the checkpoint interval in which that transaction occurred. Assigning a transaction to a checkpoint

interval is protocol-dependent, and it is the only significant difference in implementing *SafetyNet* on top of different classes of protocols (i.e., directory vs. snooping). In a directory protocol, the point of atomicity occurs when the block’s owner processes the request.

3.3 Logging

SafetyNet uses *Checkpoint Log Buffers* (*CLBs*) to incrementally checkpoint memory and coherence state. Logically, *SafetyNet* writes a memory block to a *CLB* whenever an *update-action* (i.e., store or transfer of ownership) might have to be undone in the case of a recovery. Since processors perform stores into caches and both caches and memories can transfer ownership of blocks, both caches and memories have *CLBs*. Except during recovery, *CLBs* are write-only and off the critical path.

SafetyNet only logs a block on the first update-action per checkpoint interval. To detect this case, *SafetyNet* adds a *checkpoint number* (*CN*) to each block in the cache, denoting to which checkpoint it belongs. On each update-action, *SafetyNet* (1) compares the component’s current checkpoint number (*CCN*) with the block’s *CN*, (2) logs the block if $CCN \geq CN$, (3) updates the block’s *CN* to $CCN+1$, and (4) performs the update-action. For example, a store by a processor with $CCN=3$ to a block with $CN=4$ need not be logged. Blocks with null *CNs* have not been written or transferred lately, and they implicitly belong to the recovery point as well as all subsequent checkpoints. Having *CNs* on blocks is an optimization that enables logic to determine whether logging an update-action is redundant. Figure 4 illustrates an example of logging at a cache.

When giving up ownership of a block, a component performs logging (as described above) and then sends a response with the block *and the updated CN* to the requestor. This policy follows from a key insight from Wu et al. [48]: a transfer of ownership is just like a write, in that we cannot be sure that it will not be undone by a recovery. Consider the case where ownership is transferred with its *CN* set to 3 (i.e., the sender’s *CCN* is 2) and the receiver wishes to then perform a store to it while its *CCN* is still 2. Logging is unnecessary, since the receiver was not the owner at checkpoint 2. This case is the same as an owner of a block with $CN=3$ overwriting it while its *CCN* is still 2.

The *CLBs* can be sized for performance and not correctness, since *SafetyNet* can avoid situations in which the *CLB* fills up. Even when it appears that an entry must be logged in the *CLB*, logging can be avoided at the cost of some performance. In the case of store overwrites, we can throttle requests from the CPU. For coherence ownership transfers, we can negatively acknowledge (nack) coherence requests, although this may require changing the protocol. Note that

1. In this paper, we assume a directory protocol and a 2D torus, but we have also implemented *SafetyNet* on a system with a broadcast snooping protocol and a totally ordered interconnect.

2. Otherwise, the following inconsistency could arise. Consider the case where processor P1 has a *CCN* of 3 and sends a request to the owner, P2, while P2’s *CCN* is still 2. Thus, checkpoint 3 would include the reception of the request but not its sending!




Figure 4. Logging at the Cache

a stall due to a full CLB will not cause deadlock, since the CLB will eventually either deallocate state from a checkpoint that validates or recovery occurs if validation fails.

3.4 Checkpoint Creation

Checkpoint creation must be lightweight, since it is a common-case event that occurs on each edge of the checkpoint clock. A processor checkpoints its non-memory architectural state (i.e., registers) and increments its CCN.³ A memory controller simply increments its CCN. Checkpointing of memory and coherence state is achieved through logging, so no checkpointing of that state is necessary at checkpoint creation.

Checkpoint creation policy is simply choosing a suitable checkpoint clock frequency, f_c . As f_c decreases (given a constant number of outstanding checkpoints), *SafetyNet* can tolerate longer fault detection latencies. For example, we allow four outstanding checkpoints and choose f_c equal to 10 kHz (i.e., the checkpoint interval is 100,000 processor cycles at a processor clock of 1 GHz) to enable 400,000 cycles (0.4 msec) of detection latency tolerance. The cost of increasing tolerable detection latency is larger CLBs and longer output commit delays. While decreasing f_c allows for more optimized logging, since we log only the first update-action on a block in an interval, total CLB storage is a function both of logging frequency and interval length. The value of f_c has little effect on performance, since we show in Section 4 that *SafetyNet* adds little overhead.

3.5 Checkpoint Validation

Checkpoint validation requires that all components agree that execution up until that checkpoint was fault-free. A cache controller only agrees to validate a checkpoint once every transaction it initiated in the interval before that checkpoint completed successfully. A directory controller only agrees to validate after every transaction for which it

3. Since CNs are encoded in a finite number of bits, an implementation should not re-use a CN until its previous incarnation has been discarded. We ensure this by setting the request timeout latency to be less than the minimum wraparound time.

forwarded a request to a processor owner (i.e., 3-hop transaction) completed successfully. Thus, the requestor must send an acknowledgment to the directory after its request has been satisfied, so that the directory can deallocate its buffer entry for the transaction. Any lost message will prevent recovery point advancement. If the recovery point cannot be advanced after a given amount of time, the system assumes an error has occurred (such as a lost message) and triggers a system recovery. *SafetyNet* can maintain a recovery point as long as necessary, in the worst case, by stalling execution. However, fault-free performance is best if, in the average case, fault detection mechanisms validate checkpoints fault-free in one or a few checkpoint intervals (e.g., in 100,000 cycles or 0.1 milliseconds).

We coordinate validation with a 2-phase scheme. Once every component has informed the service controllers that it is ready to advance the recovery point, the service controllers broadcast the new *recovery point checkpoint number (RPCN)*. Similar to a fuzzy barrier [22], execution does not slow while checkpoints validate in the background.

Components deallocate a checkpoint by discarding their now unneeded architectural checkpoints. A processor discards its register checkpoint. In the caches, a checkpoint is deallocated by clearing the CN of all blocks that had CN set to the newly deallocated checkpoint. Logged data at the CLBs from this checkpoint is discarded.

3.6 System Recovery and Restart

If a component detects a fault, it triggers a recovery. The recovery message, which includes the RPCN, is broadcast by the service controllers, and all nodes then recover to the recovery point. The process of recovery involves several steps, and it leverages the insight that any transactions in progress, by definition, belong to unvalidated checkpoints. First, the interconnection network is drained, and all state related to coherence transactions that were in progress at the time of the recovery is discarded. Second, processors, caches, and memories recover the RPCN checkpoints. Memories sequentially undo the actions in their CLBs. Processors restore their register checkpoints. Caches invalidate all blocks written or sent in an unvalidated checkpoint interval (i.e., blocks with non-null CNs) and undo the logged actions in their CLBs.

After recovery and reconfiguration (if needed), the service controllers broadcast a restart message to instruct the nodes to resume operation. The restart cannot begin until every node has finished its recovery. As with coordination to validate checkpoints, we implement a 2-phase coordination where every node informs the system service controllers once it is ready to restart and then the service controllers broadcast the restart message.

3.7 Summary of Implementation

We have developed an implementation of the *SafetyNet* abstraction that addresses the three challenges that were raised for logging schemes. First, we exploit checkpoint granularity to reduce the amount of logging necessary. Second, we efficiently coordinate checkpoints across the system in a logical time base that is loosely tied to physical time. Third, we enable checkpoint validation to be performed in the background, thus hiding the potentially lengthy latency of fault detection. To achieve these features, we made limited changes to the processor and the coherence protocol.

This implementation required three changes to the processor and L1 cache. First, the processor must be able to checkpoint its register state. This is not performance-critical, since it is infrequent, and copying out registers is straightforward if it does not need to be fast (we will assume 100 cycles in later results). Second, we must be able to copy old versions of blocks out of the cache before overwriting or transferring them. This increases cache bandwidth, but we will show in Section 4.3 that the increase is a small fraction. Third, we add CNs to L1 cache blocks, to enable optimized logging.

This implementation also required three changes to the underlying directory coherence protocol. First, we add checkpoint numbers on data response messages, so that the requestor knows the transaction’s point of atomicity. Second, we allow both directories and processors to nack coherence requests, in order to avoid filling a CLB. Third, a three-hop transaction requires a final acknowledgment from the requestor to the directory (to inform the directory of the transaction’s point of atomicity).

4 Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate *SafetyNet*. We begin in Section 4.1 by describing our methodology. Then, in Section 4.2, we quantitatively determine *SafetyNet* performance by running three experiments in which we compare the performance of *SafetyNet* versus that of an unprotected system. We seek to determine the impact of *SafetyNet* on fault-free performance and to determine how *SafetyNet* behaves in the presence of hard and soft faults. Lastly, in Section 4.3, we perform sensitivity analyses on the amount of cache bandwidth and CLB storage that *SafetyNet* uses.

4.1 Methodology

We simulate a 16-processor target system with the Simics full-system, multiprocessor, functional simulator [29], and we extend Simics with a memory hierarchy simulator to compute execution times. We evaluate *SafetyNet* with four commercial workloads and one scientific workload.

Table 2. Target System Parameters

L1 Cache (I and D)	128 KB, 4-way set associative
L2 Cache	4 MB, 4-way set-associative
Memory	2 GB, 64 byte blocks
Miss From Memory	180 ns (uncontended, 2-hop)
Checkpoint Log Buffer	512 kbytes total, 72 byte entries
Interconnection Network	2D torus, link b/w = 6.4 GB/sec
Checkpoint Interval	100,000 cycles = 100 μ sec

Simics. Simics is a system-level architectural simulator developed by Virtutech AB. We use Simics/sun4u, which simulates Sun Microsystems’s SPARC V9 platform architecture (e.g., used for Sun E6000s) in sufficient detail to boot unmodified Solaris 8. Simics is a functional simulator only, and it assumes that each instruction takes one cycle to execute (although I/O may take longer), but it provides an interface to support detailed memory hierarchy simulation.

Processor Model. We use Simics to model a processor core that, given a perfect memory system, would execute four billion instructions per second and generate blocking requests to the cache hierarchy and beyond. We use this simple processor model to enable tractable simulation times for full-system simulation of commercial workloads. While an out-of-order processor model might have an impact on the absolute values of the results, it would not qualitatively change them (e.g., whether a crash is avoided). For evaluating overhead for checkpointing register state, we model a conservative latency of 100 cycles. We conservatively charge eight cycles for logging store overwrites (8 bytes/cycle for 64 byte cache blocks), but these are only about 0.1% of instructions.

Memory Model. We have implemented a memory hierarchy simulator that supports a MOSI directory protocol, similar to that of the SGI Origin, with and without *SafetyNet* support. The simulator captures all state transitions (including transient states) of our coherence protocols in the cache and memory controllers. We model a 2D torus interconnection and the contention within this interconnect, including contention due to validation coordination messages. In Table 2, we present the design parameters of our target memory system. With a checkpoint interval of 100,000 cycles and four outstanding checkpoints, *SafetyNet* can tolerate fault detection latencies up to 400,000 cycles (0.4 msec at 1GHz). To exercise the protocol implementation, we drove it for billions of cycles with a random tester that injected faults and stressed corner cases by exploiting false sharing and reordering messages [47]. Using a methodology described by Alameldeen et al. [2], we simulate each design point multiple times with small, pseudo-random perturbations of memory latencies to cause

Table 3. Workloads

OLTP: Our OLTP workload is based on the TPC-C v3.0 benchmark using IBM’s DB2 v7.2 EEE database management system. We use a 1 GB 10-warehouse database stored on five raw disks and an additional dedicated database log disk. There are 8 simulated users per processor. We warm up for 10,000 transactions, and we run for 500 transactions.
Java Server: SPECjbb2000 is a server-side java benchmark that models a 3-tier system with driver threads. We used Sun’s HotSpot 1.4.0 Server JVM. Our experiments use 24 threads and 24 warehouses (~500 MB of data). We warm up for 100,000 transactions, and we run for 50,000 transactions.
Static Web Server: We use Apache 1.3.19 (www.apache.org) for SPARC/Solaris 8, configured to use pthread locks and minimal logging as the web server. We use SURGE [6] to generate web requests. We use a repository of 2,000 files (totalling ~50 MB). There are 10 simulated users per processor. We warm up for ~80,000 requests, and we run for 5000 requests.
Dynamic Web Server: Slashcode is based on a dynamic web message posting system used by slashdot.com. We use Slashcode 2.0, Apache 1.3.20, and Apache’s mod_perl 1.25 module for the web server. MySQL 3.23.39 is the database engine. The database is a snapshot of slashcode.com, and it contains ~3,000 messages. A multithreaded driver simulates browsing and posting behavior for 3 users per processor. We warm up for 240 transactions, and we run for 50 transactions.
Scientific Application: We use <i>barnes-hut</i> from the SPLASH-2 suite [46], with the 16K body input set. We measure from the start of the parallel phase to avoid measuring thread forking.

alternative scheduling paths. Error bars in our results represent one standard deviation in each direction.

Workloads. Commercial applications are an important workload for high availability systems. As such, we evaluate *SafetyNet* with four commercial applications and one scientific application, described briefly in Table 3 and in more detail by Alameldeen et al. [2].

4.2 Experiments

We perform three experiments to evaluate *SafetyNet* performance and show the results in Figure 5. For each workload, we plot five bars: two bars for systems unprotected by *SafetyNet* and three bars for systems with *SafetyNet*.

Experiment 1: Fault-Free Performance. In this experiment, we run two systems, *SafetyNet* and a similar system that is unprotected by *SafetyNet*, in a fault-free environment. In Figure 5, the first and the third bars (from the left) for each workload reflect the normalized performances of the unprotected system and *SafetyNet*, respectively. We observe that the two systems perform statistically similarly for all workloads. Intuitively, *SafetyNet* does not impact common case actions, such as loads and stores that do not




Figure 5. Performance Evaluation of *SafetyNet*

require logging. Overheads due to register checkpointing (every 100,000 cycles) and stores that require logging (0.1% of all instructions) are negligible, and back pressure due to filling up the CLBs is rarely needed. We present sensitivity analysis of CLB sizing in Section 4.3.

Experiment 2: Dropped Messages. In this experiment, we periodically inject transient faults into the system by dropping a message every 100 million cycles (i.e., ten times per second). The requestor times out on its request and triggers recovery. The second “bar” reflects the unprotected system performance (crash). The fourth bar from the right represents *SafetyNet* behavior, and we see that it is statistically similar to the fault-free scenario.⁴

The exact recovery latency is not critical, since *SafetyNet*’s recovery latency is orders of magnitude shorter than the latency of crashing and rebooting (and also preserves data integrity). Recovery latency consists of discarding unvalidated checkpoint state, restoring the state from the recovery point, re-configuring if necessary (e.g., changing the routing to avoid a dead switch), and re-executing the work that was lost between the recovery point and the fault. Re-executing lost work is the dominant factor, since the recovery point can be hundreds of thousands of cycles in the past. *SafetyNet* can tolerate longer fault detection latencies with less frequent (i.e., larger) checkpoints, at the cost of more potential lost work. Nevertheless, even a one million cycle recovery latency is still only one millisecond (i.e., much shorter than a crash).

Experiment 3: Lost Switch. In this experiment, we inject a hard fault into an interconnection network switch after one million cycles, killing the half-switch and dropping its buffered messages. The second “bar” reflects the crash of

4. The variability for the static web server and OLTP workloads is high enough to erroneously suggest, if one considers only mean values, that *SafetyNet* performs better when faults are injected.

the unprotected system. The fifth bar reflects *SafetyNet* performance, and we observe that, most importantly, *SafetyNet* avoids a crash. Performance suffers, with respect to the fault-free case, due to restricted post-fault bandwidth.

4.3 Sensitivity Analyses

To explore *SafetyNet*'s sensitivity to implementation parameters, we present analyses of *SafetyNet*'s usage of cache bandwidth and the impact of CLB sizing.

Cache Bandwidth. *SafetyNet*'s additional consumption of cache bandwidth depends on the frequencies of stores that require logging. These stores consume additional cache bandwidth for reading out the old copy of the block. Logging due to transferring cache ownership, however, does not incur additional bandwidth, since the cache line must be read anyway. In Figure 6, for the static web server workload⁵, we plot this frequency as a function of the checkpoint interval. Both axes use log scales. Distinguishing between all stores and only those stores that require logging, we notice the drop-off in the latter as the checkpoint interval increases. These trends are the same for the other workloads, and the intuition is that spatial and temporal locality reduce the number of distinct blocks touched per interval. For an interval of 100,000 cycles, only 2-3% of stores (less than 0.1% of all instructions) require logging. In Figure 7, for the static web server workload, we plot the percentage of cache bandwidth used by cache hits, cache fills, responding to coherence requests, and logging due to store overwrites. The additional cache bandwidth used by *SafetyNet* ranges from 0.3% for million cycle intervals up to 4% for short 5,000 cycle intervals.

Storage Cost. An implementation of *SafetyNet* seeks to size the CLBs to avoid performance degradation due to full CLBs. Total CLB storage is proportional to the number of allowable checkpoints and the number of entries per checkpoint. We allow for four checkpoints and a CLB entry is 72 bytes (8-byte address and 64-byte data block). The number of entries per checkpoint corresponds to logging frequency which is, in turn, a function of the frequencies of stores and coherence requests. Figure 6 shows that, on average, only about 100-150 CLB entries are created per 100,000 instructions (although the variance in this rate requires more storage). In Figure 8, we plot the performance of *SafetyNet* as a function of CLB size. While 512 kbyte and 1 Mbyte CLBs produce statistically equivalent performances across the workloads, 256 kbyte CLBs degrade the performances of *jbb* and *apache*, and 128 kbyte CLBs degrade the performances of all of our workloads.

5. We only present the results for the static web server, but these results are qualitatively the same for all of our other workloads.




Figure 6. Frequencies of Stores and Coherence Requests (Static Web Server Workload)




Figure 7. Bandwidth vs. Checkpoint Interval (Static Web Server Workload)

We do not claim that 512 kbyte CLBs are sufficient for all workloads or all design points. These workloads are necessarily scaled to enable tractable simulation times, and larger workloads may place more pressure on the CLBs. However, the primary determinants of CLB usage are the checkpoint interval length and the program behavior, and not the cache sizes. This is because logging occurs the first time a block is overwritten or transferred outside of the node during an interval, but not for transfers between caches within a given node.

5 Discussion

To this point, this paper has explained how *SafetyNet* can enable a recovery after the detection of a lost message or failed switch fault. Most generally, *SafetyNet* can enable recovery for any fault that does not corrupt ECC architectural state, provided that:

- a system can be augmented with a mechanism to detect the fault (or sign off on its absence),
- and faults are detected while *SafetyNet* still maintains a fault-free recovery point.




Figure 8. Performance vs. CLB Size

We now discuss other faults, including those that *SafetyNet* can tolerate, those for which other schemes are sufficient, and faults in the *SafetyNet* hardware itself.

5.1 Tolerating Other Faults with *SafetyNet*

This section considers additional faults, in the interconnection network and coherence protocol, that *SafetyNet* could tolerate. A typical interconnection network fault model focuses on link errors, trying to detect single, double, or burst errors. Link errors are normally detected with error detecting codes, such as parity, SECDED, or cyclic redundancy check (CRC) [14, 33]. Current systems, such as the SGI Origin’s Spider router [18], use short codes (e.g., on 8 or 16 bytes), since the code must be checked before data is forwarded or used. *SafetyNet* permits longer, and inherently stronger, codes because of its ability to tolerate long detection latencies. *SafetyNet* is also compatible with other fault models, such as lost and misrouted messages (detected with timeouts), corrupted internal switch state (detected with error detecting codes), and switch controller malfunction (detected with internal consistency checks).

There are numerous soft faults in the protocol engine that can be tolerated with global checkpoint/recovery. This class of faults includes sending the wrong message or sending duplicate messages, as well as faults in the reception of messages. *SafetyNet* also could be used to recover from design faults in the protocol, if they could be detected reliably [9, 17] and would not keep recurring after recovery (leading to livelock).

5.2 Faults Tolerated with Existing Schemes

Processor faults can be detected with numerous schemes, including parity, redundant ALUs, and redundant threads [35, 37, 42]. Localized recovery schemes, including DIVA [4], can tolerate processor faults, but *SafetyNet* combined with processor fault detection provides a unified mechanism to tolerate these and other faults.

Fault tolerance schemes for memory, both SRAM and DRAM, are already well-established, and we present the fault model and prior detection techniques for complete-

ness. Detecting faults in storage cells can be accomplished with error detecting codes. A system with *SafetyNet* has to protect the cache hierarchy and memory with ECC, since they contain memory blocks that could potentially be the only valid copies in the system, so an uncorrectable fault could be unrecoverable. Memory chip kills can be tolerated by using a RAID-like scheme for DRAM [13].

5.3 *SafetyNet* Hardware Faults

The *SafetyNet* hardware itself is also susceptible to faults, and we target single fault instances. We ensure that the service controller is not a single point of failure by using redundant controllers. The other possible single point of failure is in the communication of validation messages, but a dropped or corrupted validation message will lead to a timeout and recovery. Most other faults in the *SafetyNet* hardware only manifest themselves during a recovery, which implies a double fault situation.

6 Related Work

Related research exists in fault tolerance, as well as in logging for speculation and versioning of data. Prior work in fault tolerance can be classified into two broad categories: backward error recovery (BER) and forward error recovery (FER). Among other differences, the evaluation of *SafetyNet* also advances previous work in fault tolerance by using full-system simulation of commercial workloads.

Hardware Backward Error Recovery. In BER schemes, the state of the system is checkpointed periodically (or differences are logged), and a fault is tolerated by recovering to a pre-fault checkpoint. IBM mainframes [23, 40] use register checkpoint hardware and store-through caches to recover from processor and memory system errors, respectively. The CARER scheme [24] for uniprocessors uses a normal cache with a writeback update policy to assist rapid rollback recovery. Checkpointed system state is maintained in main memory, and checkpoints are established whenever a modified cache block needs to be replaced. Ahmed et al. [1] extend CARER for multiprocessors by synchronizing the processors whenever one needs to take a checkpoint. Wu et al.’s [48] multiprocessor extension of CARER allows a processor to write into its cache between checkpoints. Checkpointing, which flushes all modified blocks, is performed when ownership of a block modified since the last checkpoint changes. *SafetyNet* is more efficient, since it does not checkpoint before every ownership transfer. The Sequoia system [7] uses caches to hold state between checkpoints, and flushes dirty cache blocks to memory at every checkpoint. Banâtre et al. [5] describe a Recoverable Shared Memory module that requires a shadow copy of the entire memory and a mechanism for maintaining the inter-processor dependence graph.

Software Backward Error Recovery. Software checkpointing has also been used, but at radically different engineering costs. In Tandem NonStop machines, every process periodically checkpoints its state on another processor [38]. Work by Plank [32] and Wang and Hwang [44] uses software to periodically checkpoint applications to aid fault tolerance. These schemes differ in the degree of support required from the programmer, libraries, and operating system. At the link level, SCI [25] supports software retry of dropped or corrupted messages. *SafetyNet* differs from these works in that it is a hardware solution.

(Hardware) Forward Error Recovery. FER schemes use redundant hardware to mask faults. For example, redundant processors [4, 26, 27, 45] or redundant threads within a processor [42] can be used to mask processor faults. Redundant paths through adaptive networks allow packets to be routed around faults [12, 14]. The Intel 432 [27] uses replication of commodity parts to achieve a range of fault tolerance needs. The Stratus [45] computer system uses pair-and-spare processors, and the Tandem S2 [26] uses triply modular redundant (TMR) processors, for masking faults. Slipstream [42] is a lighter-weight processor scheme that uses redundant threads within a processor to mask faults. DIVA [4] uses a checker processor to implement FER on the processor (but not on the system).

Speculation and Versioning of Data. Prior research for supporting speculation has logged changes in state that is local to a node [19, 34]. *SafetyNet*'s logging is similar, although it must also log transfers of coherence ownership in our global scheme. Speculative multithreading schemes use versioning to implement sequential program semantics [11, 20, 30, 41]. Our goal differs in that we superimpose checkpoints on system execution with *parallel semantics*, to support availability. We use globally consistent checkpoints rather than local checkpoints at different places in a sequential execution.

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we develop a scheme, called *SafetyNet*, that improves the availability of shared memory multiprocessors. We describe an implementation of *SafetyNet*, and we demonstrate that it adds little performance overhead and has reasonable storage costs. In developing *SafetyNet*, this paper makes three contributions which allow *SafetyNet* to be efficient in the common case of fault free execution.

- *SafetyNet* adds no latency to the common case of 99.9% of all instructions.
- *SafetyNet* hides the latency of fault detection by pipelining the validation of checkpoints. The system can continue to execute while it determines if old checkpoints can be validated.

- *SafetyNet* efficiently coordinates checkpoint creation in logical time, without having to either quiesce the system or exchange synchronization messages.

We see interesting avenues for future work. First, one could use *SafetyNet* to tolerate many of the faults discussed in Section 5 by developing suitable detection mechanisms. Since *SafetyNet* provides recovery for long-latency detection mechanisms, we can focus on stronger, high-latency codes and signatures. Second, one could use *SafetyNet* to tolerate harder faults, such as the loss of architectural state in a processor-cache chip kill. However, this alternative design will achieve this higher level of fault-tolerance for increased overheads in time, space, and/or cost.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the Wisconsin Multifacet group, Virtutech AB, the Wisconsin Condor group, Jim Goodman, Peter Hsu, Alain Kägi, Mikko Lipasti, Mark Oskin, Ravi Rajwar, Kewal Saluja, Bob Zak, and Craig Zilles.

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